

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 02520 232125 Z

16

ACTION EUR-25

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NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 GAC-01 USIA-12 TRSE-00

MBFR-03 SAJ-01 EB-11 SS-15 NSC-10 ACDA-19 OMB-01 IO-12

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C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 2520 SECTION 1 OF 2

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MCAP, NATO

SUBJECT: DRAFT DPC MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

REF: USNATO 2400

DEFENSE REVIEW COMMITTEE ON MAY 21, 1973 COMPLETED ITS
REVIEW OF FIRST 14 PARAGRAPHS OF DRAFT MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE
(DRC/ WP(73)4(REVISED)) WHICH ARE QUOTED IN FULL BELOW.

REVIEW OF REMAINING PARAGRAPHS WILL BE CONTINUED AFTERNOON
OF MAY 22 AND WILL BE TRANSMITTED WHEN COMPLETED.

BEGIN TEXT

DRAFT MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

REDRAFT OF THE FIRST FOURTEEN PARAGRAPHS OF
DRC/ WP(73)4(REVISED)

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PAGE 02 NATO 02520 232125 Z

INTRODUCTION

THE AGREED PROCEDURES FOR THENATO DEFENCE PLANNING
REVIEW (1) CALL FOR MINISTERS TO GIVE GUIDANCE TO THE NATO

MILITARY AUTHORITIES FOR THE PREPARATION OF FORCE PROPOSALS FOR THE CURRENT PLANNING PERIOD. MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE UPON WHICH THE CURRENT STRATEGIC CONCEPT IS BASED WAS ISSUED IN 1967(2) AND HAS BEEN UPDATED IN 1969(3) AND 1971(4). THE NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT REMAINS VALID AND WE SEE NO NEED TO CHANGE IT. WE BELIEVE HOWEVER, THAT IN THE LIGHT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1971 AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE REPORT ON ALLIANCE DEFENCE PROBLEMS IN THE 1970 S AND SUBSEQUENT FOLLOW- ON REPORTS, IT IS DESIRABLE TO RESTATE CERTAIN ASPECTS OF PREVIOUS GUIDANCE WHICH WILL CLARIFY THE PRIORITIES WHICH SHOULD GOVERN NATO FORCE PLANNING OVER THE PERIOD UNTIL 1980.

SOVIET POLICY AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

2. THE QUEST FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST WAS GIVEN NEW IMPETUS BY THE ALLIANCE IN 1967. WE ARE SLOWLY PROGRESSING FROM CONFRONTATION TO EXPLORATION, AND IN SOME CASES NEGOTIATION, WITH THE OTHER SIDE. THERE IS A RENEWED DESIRE FOR MORE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE EAST COMBINED WITH GROWING PRESSURES TO DIVERT RESOURCES FROM DEFENCE TO OTHER NEEDS. SUCH

DESIRES AND PRESSURES HOWEVER MANIFEST THEMSELVES TO A MUCH LESSER DEGREE IN EASTERN COUNTRIES. THE PREPARATORY TALKS ON CSCE, MBFR AND THE ON- GOING DISCUSSION ON SALT MAY BE AN INDICATION THAT A GENERAL IMPROVEMENT IN EAST- WEST RELATIONS MAY SEEM NEARER THAN IN THE PAST, BUT ANY BENEFITS IN TERMS OF MILITARY SECURITY STILL REMAIN TO BE IDENTIFIED AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THIS GUIDANCE.

3. THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF TENSION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST HAVE STILL TO BE RESOLVED. THESE ARE IN LARGE PART IDEOLOGICAL, BUT HAVE DEVELOPED INTO A CONTEST FOR POWER IN WHICH POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ISSUES ARE ALSO INVOLVED. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT SOVIET LEADERS HAVE RENOUNCED THEIR ULTIMATE AIM OF EXTENDING SOVIET COMMUNIST POWER AND INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES, CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 02520 232125 Z

INCLUDING THESE OFFERED BY SUBVERSION, TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION AND THREATEN WESTERN INTERESTS WHEREVER THEY CAN DO SO WITHOUT MILITARY RISK. THESE POLICIES WILL BE SUPPORTED BY THE USE, DIRECT AND INDIRECT, OF THEIR MILITARY POWER, WHICH CONTINUES TO BE BUILT UP WITHOUT LOSS OF MOMENTUM ON A WORLD- WIDE SCALE.

4. WITHIN EUROPE THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE WARSAW PACT, TO MAINTAIN HER PREDOMINANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE AND TO TIGHTEN THE TIES WITH THE OTHER PACT COUNTRIES. HER AIMS INCLUDE WEAKENING THE POLITICAL COHESION OF THE WEST, PROVOKING DIVISIONS BETWEEN ITS MEMBERS, ESPECIALLY BETWEEN THE NORTH AMERICAN ALLIES AND EUROPE, AND WORKING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES FROM EUROPE. AS REGARDS

THE USE OF MILITARY POWER, HOWEVER, SHE HAS IN RECENT YEARS PURSUED A CAUTIOUS LINE, RECOGNIZING THAT ANY PRIZES, STRATEGIC, ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL WHICH SHE MIGHT GAIN THEREBY CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED AT A COST WHICH MAY RENDER THEM VALUELESS. THIS IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE SO LONG AS NATO MAINTAINS THE RELATIVE BALANCE OF MILITARY POWER.

5. IN AREAS ADJACENT TO NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, SOVIET POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR MILITARY PENETRATION IS ALREADY EVIDENT AND UNDERMINES WESTERN INTERESTS AND SECURITY. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ON WHOSE OIL RESOURCES THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY THE NATO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, ARE HEAVILY DEPENDENT. SOVIET MARITIME ACTIVITY, PARTICULARLY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, LENDS POWER AND CONVICTION TO SUPPORT FOR HER POLICIES IN THESE AREAS. FURTHER AFIELD, THE INCREASING GLOBAL DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET MARITIME FORCES STRENGTHENS SOVIET EFFORTS TO LIMIT OR REPLACE WESTERN INFLUENCE WHEREVER POSSIBLE AND TO SUPPORT REGIMES SYMPATHETIC TO THE SOVIET UNION.

6. NATO HAS SO FAR BEEN EFFECTIVE IN DETERRING AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ALLIANCE. IT CAN BE EXPECTED TO REMAIN SO PROVIDED THAT ITS CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS ALSO REMAIN EFFECTIVE. THE MILITARY ELEMENTS ARE A STRONG AND CREDIBLE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE PROVIDED MAINLY BY THE UNITED STATES, SUFFICIENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR TACTICAL USE IN NATO FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL LAND, AIR AND MARITIME FORCES OF ADEQUATE STRENGTH PROVIDED BY THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. THE SUBSTANTIAL AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN
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PAGE 04 NATO 02520 232125 Z

EUROPEAN DEFENCE PROVIDES A STRONG AND VISIBLE LINK BETWEEN THESE THREE MILITARY ELEMENTS. THE POLITICAL ELEMENT IS PROVIDED BY THE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE IN PEACETIME AND ITS SOLIDARITY UNDER ANY KIND OF PRESSURE.

7. SOVIET POLICIES AND CALCULATIONS AS TO THE RISKS AND GAINS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST NATO WILL CONTINUE TO BE INFLUENCED BY PERCEPTION OF NATO'S ABILITY AND WILL TO RESIST AND RETALIATE; THAT IS BY THE ASSESSMENT OF OUR ABILITY TO RESIST AGGRESSION AND OF OUR DETERMINATION TO CARRY ON THE CONFLICT BY BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND/ OR NUCLEAR MEANS. THE EVIDENT CAPABILITIES OF NATO FORCES IN ALL AREAS AND THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE ARE COMPLEMENTARY ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL DETERRENCE. PROVIDED THIS COMBINATION CONTINUES TO CONVINCE THE WARSAW PACT THAT IN EUROPE NO EAST GAINS ARE POSSIBLE AND THAT AN ATTACK ON RUMSFELD

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